Myths Debunked: Classroom Door Locks and Active Shooter Defenses
Myths and Facts about Classroom Door Locks as an Active Shooter Defense
Author: Salvatore Emma, VP Operations, Defcon Products, LLC.
September 19, 2019
This article is intended to share the facts (based on extensive research) on how to keep students and teachers safer during an active shooter event.
"Teachers were reluctant to enter the halls to lock the doors. The lack of an established policy on the locking and/or staffing of doors and gates on campus is a security failure. " – Parkland Commission Report http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/CommissionReport.pdf
"Regardless of the type of door used, all classrooms should have locks that allow the teacher to lock the classroom door from the inside." Final Report from the Federal Commission on School Safety 2018. https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safety-report.pdf
“The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission includes a standard requiring classroom and other safe-haven areas to have doors that can be locked from the inside. The Commission cannot emphasize enough the importance of this recommendation." Sandy Hook Advisory http://www.shac.ct.gov/SHAC_Final_Report_3-6-2015.pdf
"Some universities have locks on classroom doors, but they typically operate by key from the hallway. They are intended to keep students and strangers out when they are not in use and often cannot be locked from the inside." Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel. https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/prevail/docs/April16ReportRev20091204.pdf
"SWAT Teams sometimes found it difficult to enter locked classrooms and were forced to blast the locks on the doors. The Library and Cafeteria could not be locked and that is where several students were killed and wounded." Columbine Governor’s Commission Report https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-%20Governor's%20Commission%20Report.pdf
“It’s no coincidence the two adults who died, Ann Perkins and Cynthia Tisdale, were both substitute teachers. Substitutes weren’t trained on how to respond to bomb threats or active shooters, and they didn’t have keys for doors in the school. They didn’t have access to the school’s computer system to communicate with other faculty, and the phones inside the classrooms didn’t work”. – Houston Chronical https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics/texas/article/Substitute-teacher-wounded-in-Santa-Fe-High-13750352.php
Based on several texts and studies written following active shooter events such as Virginia Tech, Columbine, Parkland, Sandy Hook, and others, one theme holds consistently true: Providing Teachers with a fast and effective way to lock a classroom door from the inside will save lives. This single basic defensive measure should be easy to implement, right? Unfortunately, not so simple.
At Virginia Tech: “the classrooms in Norris hall are mostly square and furnished with lightweight furniture. None of the classroom doors were lockable from the inside and there was no available messaging system by which professors could initiate or receive an alert. This design afforded the students and faculty in Norris Hall no reliable ability to effectively barricade classrooms or call for help.” - Defeating the Active Shooter: Applying Facility Upgrades in Order to Mitigate the Effects of Active Shooters in High Occupancy Facilities. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/7337/12Jun_Ergenbright_Hubbard.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
The Naval Postgraduate Study above analyzed 14 active shooter events. Once conclusion is that indicates that nothing slows the “rate of kill” during an active shooter event more effectively than a “victim initiated mitigation” beginning with a simple lock on a door. Police are 5-10 minutes away. An SRO is not likely to be in the direct vicinity. Intelligence gathering and phycologists are needed and effective, but not as immediately effective as a lock on a door. Teachers are not trained as first responders and most are not interested in carrying a gun in school. The jury is still out about arming teachers and whether it will cause more harm than good. But, this does not diminish the need for a way for all teachers to protect their classrooms.
Easy-to-install defensive door locks are in direct conflict to existing building and fire codes. The door hardware and construction industries have supported and written building codes which specify high priced door hardware which is built for fire safety, not active shooter defenses. The fear is that barricade devices will trap people in a classroom during a fire emergency. But, using statistics published by the National Fire Protection Association, a person’s chances of being injured during a fire evacuation WHILE the door is locked by and active shooter barricade are 1 in 2.6 million. In other words, a person is more likely to be struck by lightening four times in the same year than to be injured by fire while an active shooter barricade is locked. Source: https://teacherlock.com/blog/f/the-facts-about-fire-emergencies-and-lockdowns
In addition, the billion-dollar door industry spends lots of money to make the building codes even more restrictive. It’s not to protect kids as much as it is to protect their revenue.
There is a great deal of misinformation, misconception, and conjecture which does not serve to improve the safety and defenses against an active shooter. Many well-intentioned but uninformed individuals provide misguiding information which does nothing more than to give a false sense of security. For example, Brockton Massachusetts found itself in the national news when Lowes Corporation sold blue “go-buckets” to the city which distributed them to each classroom teacher. The buckets contained rope, a door chock, a hammer, and a roll of duct tape. Now, imagine that an active shooter is outside your door. Teachers are not going to be able to fashion a knot and lasso the door handle. Never mind the fact that a person with bad intentions could get that bucket and do harm with the contents!
In a small town in Pennsylvania, a school superintendent encouraged students to bring a “river rock” to school as an active shooter defense.
A university in Michigan told students to bring a hockey puck to school for the same reason. Yet, none of these communities have provided teachers with an easy way to lock a door from the inside.
Listed in no particular order are our observations of these myths and our attempt to provide a better understanding.
1. Myth: It won't happen here.
We don't really need to debunk this, but wanted to make a point. Playing the odds that an attack will not happen at your school is a dangerous assumption. Thoughtful preparation and practice is what saves lives during an emergency.
2. Myth: Teachers will be warned ahead of time to lock down.
This could not be further from the truth. Do not count on time to prepare. Imagine that the shooting is already going on in the hallway. What would you do? You have only seconds to make the right decisions. Likely, the school’s warning system will be inadequate. In many schools, a series of numbers and pauses are required to use the public address paging systems. Time is not on your side during an active shooter event. You must be prepared to be instantly reflexive using muscle memory to drive you into safety. This only comes with drilling and practicing.
2. Myth: Acronym-based safety protocols will guide your thinking during an active shooter event.
Obviously, the more letters in your acronym (ALIC…, RHF, etc) the less of a chance you have of remembering them during a high stress event. For example, many people who have been trained on various active shooter defense “systems” will forget anything after “Alert.” It’s not that these are bad systems, but it is the way the human brain works under stress. It’s for this reason, the Author like Run Hide Fight. It’s easy to remember.
3. Myth: My door has a lock which uses a key from the inside, so I am all set.
Any door locking device which requires fine motor skills will not be effective. Imagine that the concussive effect of gunfire in the hall is rattling doors and windows and shaking dust from the ceiling. Imagine that the dust has set off the fire alarms and children and teachers are screaming and scared. It is a difficult scenario to imagine, but under these circumstances your fine motor skills will be absent. Seemingly simple tasks such as finding a key which looks like any other key, inserting it into the door lever, twisting it in the right direction, and checking to see if the door is locked, will be impossible.
4. Myth: Keeping my door locked all day and using a magnet strip will keep me safe.
While active shooter incidents are extremely rare, a bully or worse can exist in the classroom 180 days per school year. Any door locking device which is accessible to anyone is a mistake. Also, a magnet strip defeats the door’s latching mechanism which is a fire hazard.
5. Myth: My school installed video surveillance systems, to improve safety.
Video surveillance is a good idea for forensic or after-the-fact intelligence gathering but there is little that a standard surveillance system will do to harden the school’s defenses. Facial recognition systems can help but must be used with an effective intelligence gathering and response protocol.
6. Myth: Piling desks and chairs on the door will keep the bad guy out.
Since most doors open into the hallway, this is hardly a barricade. We see schools all over the country being taught to barricade the door with anything possible. Not only does this take valuable time, it’s largely ineffective.
7. Myth: My school told me to bring rocks and hockey pucks to throw at active shooters.
While we believe in using anything to defend yourself as a last resort, we don’t want people to have a false sense of security and bringing a hockey puck to a gun fight is generally a bad idea. Good people will need to be trained on delivering violence to an active shooter in a way that they have mentally prepared for. Defending yourself is a last resort and it’s always better to escape if possible. Understanding and being aware of your surroundings and your situation will save your life and give you more of a fighting chance than a hockey puck or a rock.
8. Myth: My school’s doors all lock down automatically from the office which is safer than individual locks on doors.
Trapping people in the hallway can be a bad idea. Teachers should always maintain control over the classroom door. At the very least, all teachers and substitutes should be trained on the use of classroom locking hardware.
9. Myth: Metal Detectors seem like a good way to start.
Unfortunately, metal detectors cause a bottleneck in most school environments which creates a soft target area for people looking to do harm. Metal detectors are impractical and generally don’t serve much purpose in the school environment for these reasons.
10. Myth: My door has a “red button” door lock which allows anyone to lock the door at any time. This will allow students to lock at any time which is safer.
Again, only authorized and trained personnel should be allowed to lock a door. It is entirely possible that students will lock the door at the wrong time, or bullies will take control of the room.
There is no singular approach to classroom security but we believe that providing a quick and reliable door lock which locks from the inside is a great start. A layered approach to communications, prevention, door hardening, and training is required.
About the Author:
Salvatore Emma is Vice President of Defcon Products, LLC. manufacturer of the TeacherLock® classroom door locking device. This report was prepared based on hundreds of interviews with teachers, law enforcement officers, security experts, fire officials, and parents.